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LABOR LAW: UNION PREVENTED FROM EXPELLING
MEMBERS FOR ENGAGING IN CAMPAIGN TO PASS
"RIGHT-TO-WORK" MEASURE
A LABOR UNION often imposes some form of union discipline over
dissident members in order to present a united collective bargaining
front.' The recent California case of Mitchell v. International Asso-
ciation of Machinist2 illustrates how union discipline may conflict with
individual rights of political expression and community interest in free
debate.
Mitchell and Mulgrew, long-standing members of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists,' actively campaigned for a proposed
state constitutional amendment which would prohibit both closed and
union shops in California. As a result of these activities, they were
expelled from the union for conduct "unbecoming a member of the
I.A.M." in violation of the Machinist constitution.4  Thereafter, both
Mitchell and Mulgrew filed for a writ of mandate, seeking reinstate-
ment. The trial court held that petitioners had not exhausted their
remedies within the union and declined to grant judicial relief.5
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal determined that the peti-
tioners were not required to exhaust their internal remedies and there-
'The term "union discipline" includes all the punitive measures that can be taken
by a union against an offending member. The most common are fines, suspension for
a limited period, and expulsion. Expulsion is the most drastic and, consequently, is
the primary cause of litigation in this area. See generally Summers, Diciplinary
Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 14 (1951).
2 196 Cal. App. 2d 903, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (196i), petition for hearing denied,
No. 24913, Cal. Sup. Ct. (x962).
'Mitchell, a union member for 17 years, had served in most of the local lodge
offices, including that of president. Mulgrew, a member for 6 years, had also served
in several official capacities. Opening Brief for Appellants, pp. 2-3.
" INT'L ASS'N MACHINISTS, CONsT. art. K, § 3 (1958). Petitioners did not speak
officially for the union, nor did they make representations to that effect. Several de-
cisions have upheld expulsion of a member who claimed to speak officially and mis-
represented the union position. See note x4 infra.
5 39 CCH LAB. CAS. 7 66321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 596o). Under the Machinist Con-
stitution, petitioners had the right of final appeal to the Grand Lodge Convention
which was scheduled to convene in September x96o, some fourteen months distant from
the date of petitioners' expulsion. The Superior Court held that fourteen months was
not an unreasonable delay and consequently, petitioners were premature in seeking judi-
cial relief. By dictum, the court stated that the union action was neither in violation
of public policy nor petitioners' constitutional rights.
fore could properly seek judicial relief.' The court then devoted the
greater portion of its opinion to a consideration of the central issue in
the case-the right of the union to expel petitioners for engaging in
political activity outside the union.7 After considering the interests of
the union, the petitioners, and the general community," the appellate
court reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that the union
had wrongfully expelled petitioners and ordering their reinstatement.
The propriety of union expulsion usually has been determined by
contract theory. Under this theory, a union member and the union
form a membership contract, the terms thereof being expressed in the
union bylaws and constitution.' Expulsion on grounds other than
those expressly enumerated gives the expelled union member a cause
of action for breach of contract. 10 As a safeguard against a union's
*The appellate court held that fourteen months constituted an unreasonable delay
as a matter of law; therefore, petitioners were not required to exhaust their internal
union remedies. Many commentators applaud the exhaustion doctrine as a contribution
toward internal union democracy, since the members otherwise would have no interest
in improving their union's internal adjustment procedure. See Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of x959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 872
(196o) i Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REv.
6o9, 615 (1959).
Professor Summers, however, lists five exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine and
suggests that "since these are the only grounds on which the courts ever reverse union
discipline, the obvious effect of the exception is that if the court will give relief at all,
it will do so without requiring any internal appeals." Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1o49, 2o92 (2951). The truth of this observa-
tion is evidenced by the conflict over what constitutes an unreasonable delay. Compare
Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1931) (over a year's delay not un-
reasonable), with Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, x58 Cal. App. 2d
556, 323 P.2d 222 (1958) (nine month's delay unreasonable).
"The question is whether there will be an excessive loss of freedom if unions are
permitted to make political conformity the price of membership." 16 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
' The modern union, through its collective bargaining status, exercises vast control
over its members' economic lives. Because of this special status, the union assumes
reciprocal responsibilities toward its membership and the public generally, and any
disciplinary action must be viewed with reference to these other important considerations.
Thus, it has been contended that a union must be distinguished from other private
organizations, such as fraternal societies and church groups. See Chafee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (2930)-
' "The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association express the terms
of a contract which define the privileges secured and the duties assumed by those who
have become members." Poplin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 278, 277 N.E. 833, 834
(1931). Accord, DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, x Cal. zd 139, 187
P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (2948) 5 Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159,
276 N.E. 791 (2932).
1" See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (2958) (Court
granted reinstatement and damages for lost wages and mental suffering). The Supreme
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abuse of its disciplinary powers, courts have required that internal union
procedures leading to expulsion conform to a rough standard of due
process in accord with the fifth and fourteenth amendments."
Once it has been determined that expulsion was improper, the most
prevalent remedy has been reinstatement in the union.12  When a
union member has sought damages for wrongful expulsion, however,
courts have invoked property law principles to determine the measure
of damages. Recognizing that union membership is a "property right,"
on which may depend wages and strike, death, and pension benefits,
courts have utilized these property rights as a measure of damages. 8
While these theories are not a realistic description of the legal
relationship existing between a union and its members, but are rather a
convenient method upon which to base judicial remedy, they have served
the courts reasonably well. When followed with rigid logical con-
Court, in a split decision, held that since an expelled member's cause of action is based
on contract law, state courts are not prevented from granting relief under the doctrine
of federal pre-emption.
Some commentators have suggested that a tort action for interference with an
advantageous economic relationship would be a more realistic basis for granting relief.
See Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 95-6 (196o) ; Chafee, rutra note 8,
at 1007. This would seem the more appropriate remedy under a closed shop agreement,
where expulsion from the union automatically leads to loss of employment. The closed
shop agreement, however, is now illegal under the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act).
" As the court said in Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.ad 8 a, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
"[T]echnical precision is not necessary, but the essential fundamentals of fair play-
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. . . ." See Wollett & Lampman,
The Law of Union Factionalism-the Case of the Sailors, 4 STAN. L. REv. 177 , I93-4(1952) and cases cited; Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union
,Affairs (pts. 1-2), 44. ILL. L. REV. 425, 631, 66z-2 (.95o).
Despite formal safeguards in a minority of union constitutions, providing for a
statement of charges, serving of formal notice, formal trial and final appeal to the
international convention, serious procedural defects may persist. Professor Williams
suggests that the most serious defect is lack of an independent tribunal: "If not manned
by union officers, the tribunal is created by them, and the pressures for voting the
'correct' result-that is, the one desired by the officers-is overwhelming." Williams,
The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TExAs L. Rsv. 8z6, 833 (-954).
2 Although a member's activity was specified as a ground for expulsion, occasionally
a court has ordered reinstatement when it felt that the union's action was contrary to
public policy. See, e.g., Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 21o Ala.
496, 98 So. 569 (1923) (declaration of patriotism for country above union loyalty
improper ground for expulsion).
"See, e.g., Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 124 N.J. Eq. z69, i
A.zd 386 (1938) (damages of lost wages). Recoverable damages extend to punitive
damages. See, e.g., Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 72o Ala. 496,
98 So. 569 (zg3).
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sistency, however, they have led in a few instances to inequitable
results.14
Commendably, Mitchell abandoned the somewhat mechanical ap-
proach of prior cases and made explicit the value judgments on which
the decision rested. Taking a pragmatic approach, the District Court
of Appeal sought to ascertain the interests of the union, the petitioners,
and the community and thereby determine which should be given
priority in this instance. Turning first to the legitimate interests of the
union, the court recognized that a union could discipline "treasonous"
activities by its members. This disciplinary power is necessary to pre-
serve the union's status as an effective collective bargaining agent and
may be exercised over members who serve as company spies,1 dual
unionists,16 or impair adherence to the collective bargaining contract.1T
In "treason" cases, the expelled member is undeserving of judicial
sympathy. Moreover, no countervailing interest of the community is
impaired, since the union action does not concern the public at large.
Of an entirely different order, according to Mitchell, are those
cases in which unions have attempted to discipline members for per-
forming specific citizenship duties. For example, courts have prevented
union expulsion of a member for enforcing state laws against a fellow
member," voting in an official capacity for a non-union member to serve
on a municipal board,'9 or testifying against the union before a govern-
ment commission ° or in court.2' In this area, the community interest
demands that the individual union member fulfill his specific citizenship
duty without union interference.
", Thus, the court in Pfoh v. Whitney, 62 N.E.zd 744 (Ohio App. 1945), accepting
the converse of the contract theory, i.e., that any conduct of a member may be punished
which is specified in the union constitution, upheld a member's expulsion for distributing
Wendell Wilkie circulars without permission of the union president. Summers, supra note
6, at io63, views Pfoh as an aberrant result of the contract theory.
1" Burke v. Monumental Div. 52, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 273 Fed. 707 (D.
Md. x919) (reversed on other grounds).
" Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.zd 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (court upheld expulsion of
local president for withholding per capita dues and applying to rival union for charter).
"'United States Rubber Co. & United Rubber Workers, zi War. Lab. Rep. i8
(x945) (National War Labor Board upheld union fines assessed members for striking in
violation of contract).
"S Manning v. Klein, i Pa. Super. zTo (1895).
" Schneider v. Local 6o, United Assn of Journeymen Plumbers, ix6 La. 270, 40
So. 700 (.905).
50 Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, x65 N.E. 68 (1929).
"Thompson v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 9t
S.W. 834 (1905).
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It seems well established, then, that a union may expel a member
who acts in opposition to official union policy in purely economic mat-
ters, 22 but may not expel a member who serves the community under
government mandate. The court in Mitchell, however, characterized
the advocacy of voluntary unionism as primarily political in nature
and falling somewhere between the two extremes. While acknowledg-
ing that the International Association of Machinists reasonably might
regard voluntary unionism as inimical to its best interests and officially
oppose enactment of "right-to-work" measures, the court denied that the
issue was so patently inimical that the union could expel members who
took a different stand. 3 The court dismissed the contention that loss
of employment was necessary for judicial intervention. "4 While peti-
tioners were not deprived of employment, they were deprived of other
substantial rights. Because of their expulsion, petitioners were denied
any voice in the union, which, as exclusive collective bargaining agent,
negotiated the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment. More-
over, although petitioners were not engaged in fulfilling mandatory
citizenship obligations, the court regarded the freedom to express politi-
cal views as so important that it formed "the very heart of a democratic
body, pumping the lifeblood of ideas without which our system could
22 In addition to "treasonous" activities there are several other economic misdeeds for
which unions validly may expel members. Perhaps the most widely accepted ground is
non-payment of union dues. See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 483, 494 (1950). This ground is codified in §§ 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)
of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) which provide that under
a union shop agreement the only ground upon which the union may seek the discharge
of a union member is the non-payment of union dues. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), (b)(z) (1958). See Note, 45 GEO. L.J. 250 (1957).
" In Mitchell, the court reached a question specifically left open in several prior
decisions. The California Supreme Court in DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio
Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.zd 769 (1947)
, 
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948), held
that the union could expel a member who refused to help finance a union campaign to
defeat passage of a state right-to-work measure. The United States Supreme Court
in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (i96t), however, narrowly
interpreted the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (i9z6), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ ISI-
88 (1958), to prohibit expenditure of members' dues for political purposes. In neither
case was the question of required personal indorsement of ofcial union policies con-
sidered. As the California court said of DeMille: "[H]e had and continued to have
absolute freedom to think or announce what views he pleased. .. " 31 Cal. 2d at x5t,
187 P.zd at 777- See Cox, op. cit. supra note io, at iii.
"Petitioners, working under a maintenance of membership contract, remained em-
ployed throughout the union trial proceedings and after their expulsion from the union.
If, however, the union had obtained petitioners' discharge, the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) would have been applicable and would have afforded a
remedy. See note 2z supra.
(Vol. z962:463
not survive. ' 25 This freedom would be meaningless if petitioners were
required to forego their union membership as the price of speaking out
on political issues. 28  The court emphasized that the community, as well
as the individual, has a vested interest in the free exchange of ideas
and stands to profit from political debate. After surveying the com-
peting interests, the court concluded that "it could not be more apparent
where the balance lies"27 and ordered petitioners' reinstatement.
In deciding Mitchell, however, the court did not formulate any
dear legal principle to replace the rationales traditionally utilized in
granting relief to wrongfully expelled union members. Arguably the
court could have found such a principle available in the concept of
"governmental action." In a related area, the exclusion of minority
groups from union membership, the Supreme Court has held that a
union under the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act28 must represent
all members of a bargaining unit without discrimination.29  The lower
federal courts have not extended this holding to require that a Railway
Labor Act union accept all individuals into full membership, regardless
of race.30  The Supreme Court of Kansas, however, has held that a
union's status as collective bargaining agent under the Railway Labor
Act transforms it into a government agency: therefore, exclusion of
Negroes from full membership and participation in the union amounted
to governmental action in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
ws 16 Cal. Rptr. at 8S8.
"0 The court also pointed out that expulsion has the additional effect of intimidating
those members who remain in the union. While admitting that this might be a legiti-
mate objective of the union in some situations, the court added, "the very question to
be decided is whether the community ought to tolerate that result in these circum-
stances." 16 Cal. Rptr. at Sig.
"Id. at 89.
2844 Stat. 577 (i9±6), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-88 (1958).
29 See Railway Employes' v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (x956); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (x944). See Comment, 42 IowA L. REv. 113 (x956);
Comment, 1953 WIs. L. REv. 5x6.
"See Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, is6 F. Supp. 89 (N.D.
Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), af§'d, 262 F.±d 359 (6th Cir. xg58), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 935 0959)- In a suit to compel union admission, the district court
denied that Negro fireman had established the necessary nexus between union action and
the federal government to constitute a violation of the fifth amendment. "Actions by
the Brotherhood can be attributed to the Congress only if the act [Railway Labor Act]
* . . clothes the Brotherhood with some or all of the attributes of a federal agency.
The court is satisfied that this act is not sufficient to change the character of the or-
ganization from that of private association to that of governmental agency." iS6
F. Supp. at 93- Cf. Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (x957) (denial of
membership to Negroes not a violation of fourteenth amendment).
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amendment." Under the facts of the Mitchell case, a similar argument
could be made.32 While broader policy considerations may have pre-
vented the California court from resting its decision on this ground, it
seems that the court reasonably could have held that the International
Association of Machinists, acting under authority of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act,83 violated the United States Constitution in ex-
pelling petitioners for exercising their rights of free speech guaranteed
by the first amendment. 4
Commentators have written extensively on the general problem of
union discipline and have suggested several remedies for unwarranted
union interference with individual expression. Most frequently the
remedy proposed is through statutory reform.35 Other commentators
"'Betts v. Easley, 16x Kan. 459, 169 P.zd 831 (.946).
"The Railway Labor Act, unlike the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act), permits union shops "notwithstanding any . .. law .. .of any State."
64 Stat. 1238 (1951), +5 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (x958). In Railway Employes' v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (z956), Mr. Justice Douglas stated that this permissive
language gave a union shop agreement the "imprimatur" of federal law and therefore,
prohibited union violation of the first amendment. The International Association of
Machinists local lodge in the present case was under the Labor Management Relations
Act rather than the Railway Labor Act. Nonetheless, the similarity of the two acts,
especially provisions relating to union exclusive collective bargaining rights, seems of
greater importance than the differences for present purposes. Under both acts, unions
represent all employees of the appropriate unit regardless of whether or not all em-
ployees are union members. Compare 6i Stat. 143 (947), 29 U.S.C. § 15 9 (a)
(1958), with 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1958).
as 6z Stat. 136 (947), 29 U.S.C. H8 14--97 (1958).
"The majority opinion in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (zx61), rested on a statutory interpretation of the Railway Labor Act. Four
justices, however, reached the constitutional question. It seems certain, therefore, that
the Court eventually will reach the underlying constitutional issue of union interference
with freedom of speech. The present case appears even more ripe for constitutional
application, since petitioners were punished for political expression and did not merely
complain about union political expenditures. See note 23 supra. Wellington, The
Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961),
questions the wisdom of applying the concept of governmental action to unions. But cf.
Note, 42 MINN. L. REV. 942 (1958). A union member's right of free speech need not
be absolute. Therefore in "treason" cases (e.g., where a union member advocates the
abolition of unions), courts could formulate a "clear and present danger" test to pro-
tect union interests.
"A variety of statutory reforms have been suggested: (I) amendment of the
National Labor Relations Act to make expulsion for individual political activities a
union unfair labor practice. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LABOa UNION
BILL OF RIGHtS, §§ x, V, VI (1958); (2) amendment of the act to require that a union
submit disputes in this area to an arbitrator with resort by the expelled union member to
the National Labor Relations Board in the event that the union refuses. See Williams,
supra note zi, at 826; (3) passage of a separate statute establishing flexible substantive
have taken a less drastic view of the reform needed and have suggested
that greater judicial emphasis on individual rights of free speech and
closer supervision of union internal trial procedure would be sufficient."8
Congress apparently is in accord with the last approach, as evidenced
by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of I959. 37
While this act does guarantee union members the right of free speech
and assembly in regard to internal union affairs,38 it does little more
than publicize the existing common law remedies for freedom of ex-
pression outside the union 9 The enlightened decision and general
approach of Mitchell is a vindication of congressional belief that further
legislation is not needed to preserve internal union democracy.
and procedural standards of union discipline. See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 1x.
"Wollett & Lampman, supra note i i. See also Wellington, supra note 34.
73 Stat. 522 (x959), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-02, 411-15 (Supp. 1959).
as "No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing." Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § iox(a)(5), 73 Stat.
522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 41(a) (5) (Supp. 1959). See Cox, oP. cit. supra note Io,
at 96-x1; Aaron, supra note 6, at 86o-66.
""Labor Management Reporting And Disclosure Act § ioz(a)(2), 73 Stat. 522
(x99), 29 U.S.C.A. § 4xi(a)(2) (Supp. 1959). Sections 102 and 103 provide for
civil remedy in both federal and state courts.
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